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ABSTRACT 
Using data from individual transactions for the period 1994-2010 in the French NUTS2 region 
Brittany, the authors investigated how environmental regulations and transaction land regulations 
influence the price of sold plots. Regressions on three sub-samples of buyers were performed in order 
to assess whether different buyers have different attitudes or plans regarding the farmland purchased: 
a sub-sample including only farmer-buyers, a sub-sample including non-farmer individual buyers, and 
a sub-sample including non-farmer non-individual buyers. Estimations were performed ignoring and 
accounting for spatial interactions (model SARAR). 
Results indicate that the price of land decreases when buyers are farmers, that the nitrate surplus area 
zoning increases the price of land, even more so for farmer-buyers. Regarding land transaction 
regulations, there is a negative effect, on land price, of the purchaser being the current tenant or being 
the land regulating public body SAFER. Estimating the model on different sub-samples depending on 
the buyers’ type shed light on the factors that are more important for each buyer.  
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1. Introduction 
The observation of time and space variations in prices of agricultural land has triggered a 
large body of literature on farmland price formation. Most of the research is based on the 
Ricardo capitalisation formula, where land price is given by the discounted value of expected 
agricultural revenues. However, the discrepancy between the development of agricultural 
revenues and the development of land prices has questioned the validity of the simple 
Ricardo capitalisation formula (Weersink et al., 1999). In particular it is now well 
acknowledged that pressure from non-agricultural activities, such as urban development, 
transport infrastructures, and tourism, plays an important role on farmland price. It is also 
now well known that agricultural policies affect land price. In particular, agricultural 
subsidies are capitalised into land prices (for a review, see Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009). 
Environmental regulations such as zonings may also be capitalised in land prices 
(Henneberry and Barrow, 1990; Vaillancourt and Monty, 1985; Le Goffe and Salanié, 2005). 
Institutional regulations may also affect the market for agricultural land. For example, land 
regulations are an important feature of developed countries, and may exist in the form of 
prohibited land ownership for specific entities, pre-emptive rights for specific buyers, 
restrictions regarding the size of the plot exchanged (Ciaian et al., 2012). In France in 
particular, land regulations are relatively strong, among the strongest in Europe (Van Herck 
et al., 2012). How regulations of land transactions affect agricultural land price is 
nevertheless little known. 
This paper contributes to this issue. The objective is to estimate the determinants of 
agricultural land price in a French region with individual transaction data during 1994-2010. 
In particular, we aim to assess the role of regulations that may affect farmland transactions 
price. We focus on the role of environmental and land transaction regulations on agricultural 
land price. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the case study and background 
on regulations. Section 3 explains the conceptual framework and Section 4 presents the data 
and variables used. Section 5 describes the results and the last section concludes. 
                                                        
∗ Laure Latruffe is a Researcher at INRA (French National Institute for Agricultural Research). Jean 
Joseph Minviel is a PhD student at INRA. Julien Salanié is a lecturer at Agrocampus Ouest. 
The authors wish to thank Elodie Letort-Le Dréau, Sylvain Cariou and Yann Desjeux for their help 
with the data, and Pierre Dupraz, Alexandre Gohin, Chantal Le Mouël and Laurent Piet for their 
valuable comments. 
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2. Background: case study and regulations 
This section describes the region studied, and the regulations considered. The case study is 
Brittany, a French administrative region at the NUTS21 level located in Western France. It 
consists of four NUTS3 regions, 201 NUTS4 districts and 1,270 municipalities. The region 
has a strong agricultural character: it is among the first agricultural European regions. In 
particular it is the first region in the European (EU) in terms of milk production, with 3.7% of 
the EU production in 2010 (Eurostat, 2010). The region is also a big producer of pork, 
poultry products and vegetables. In 2010 it accounted for 20%, 54% and 22% respectively, of 
French farms specialised in milk, pork and poultry respectively (Agreste, 2011). In terms of 
farm structures, in 2010 the region accounted for 6%, 8% and 21% respectively, of the French 
utilised agricultural area (UAA), number of farms and number of livestock units respectively 
(DRAAF Bretagne, 2011). 
Pollution from agriculture in Brittany is a crucial problem, in particular in terms of livestock 
dejections, resulting in high nitrogen rates in water and, more recently, in high concentration 
of green algae in some ocean bays. Following the 1991 EU Nitrate Directive (91/676/CEE) the 
whole region has been classified in nitrate vulnerable areas since 1994. This implies that all 
farmers in Brittany must comply with specific farming practices, such as keeping a yearly 
register with fertiliser quantities used on the farm, not using fertilisers outside specific 
periods and implementing grass buffer strips along rivers. In addition, some districts in the 
region are subject to more restrictive practices as they are classified in nitrate surplus areas 
(“zones d’excédent structurel”). This zoning is based on the quantity of livestock dejections in 
the district: if it would lead to a nitrogen quantity greater than the authorised ceiling of 170 
kg per hectare, then the district is included in the zoning. There, farmers’ practices are more 
constrained, in terms of livestock head numbers, quantity of nitrogen produced, and use of 
the manure. Figure 1 shows the districts in Brittany which are subject to such zoning since 
2010. In 2010 about four among ten NUTS4 districts in the region were subject to such 
zoning, and the average nitrogen quantity in the region was 178 kg per hectare (DRAAF 
Bretagne, 2012). 
Figure 1. Brittany’s districts in the environmental zoning of nitrate surplus areas in 2010 
 
Source: Observatoire de l’Eau en Bretagne. 
                                                        
1 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) provides a single uniform breakdown of 
territorial units for the production of regional statistics for the EU. In France, NUTS2 corresponds to 
the French administrative regions (“régions”), NUTS3 corresponds to the French administrative sub-
regions (“départements”) and NUTS4 corresponds to the French administrative districts (“cantons”). 
France (excluding overseas territories) consists of 22 NUTS2 regions and 96 NUTS3 regions. 
(source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction). 
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Adding to this is the fact that the region is densely populated and attractive in terms of 
population flows. In 2009, among the 22 NUTS2 regions in France, it was the seventh most 
densely populated region with 116 inhabitants per square kilometre, the fifth region in terms 
of incoming population flows, and it had the lowest unemployment rate (9.3%) (INSEE, 
2009). All this results in conflicts over land use between agriculture and other land uses, such 
as urban development. During 1990-2000 Brittany was the fifth French NUTS2 region in 
terms of rate of urbanisation of agricultural land, a situation slightly attenuated during 2000-
2006 (seventh region) (INSEE, 2009). 
Despite the urban development pressure on agricultural land, the price of such land remains 
low in Brittany as in the rest of France. The average price of agricultural land (for plots larger 
than 0.7 hectare and excluding land with vineyards) in France in 2000 and 2010 was 
respectively 3,480 and 5,070 Euros per hectare, while the respective figures for Brittany were 
3,120 and 4,980 Euros (Agreste, 2012). These figures are relatively lower than most of the EU 
countries, whose average price is in general above 9,000 Euros per hectare (Figure 1 in 
Ciaian et al., 2010). One reason for such low figures compared to other European countries 
may be the role of specific bodies regulating land transactions, the SAFERs (“Sociétés 
d’aménagement foncier et d’établissement rural”) (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006). SAFERs 
are private bodies with public service missions to oversee land transactions in order to 
support the settlement of farmers, favour farm consolidation and limit farm enlargement, 
and avoid price speculation. For this, each plot transaction is notified by notaries to the local 
SAFER, which then has two months to approve or refuse the transaction. The transaction is 
accepted by the SAFER if it does not go against its above-mentioned missions. In the inverse 
situation, the transaction is rejected and the SAFER tries to reach a mutual agreement with 
the buyer and the seller. If this is not possible, SAFERs have a pre-emption right on the land 
exchanged: they can purchase land at a lower price than the original one, and re-sell it later at 
a lower price, or at the same price but to another buyer of their choice. 
The situation described above is specific to France. In general there may exist additional 
regulations that may affect land transactions in terms of market participation, such as 
inheritance laws, pre-emptive rights, and restrictions on land ownership or land use (Latruffe 
and Le Mouël, 2006). In this paper we consider the case of pre-emptive rights from the 
current tenant farmer. A farmer renting in a parcel of land has a pre-emptive right for the 
purchase of the parcel if the landlord decides to sell. This means that the tenant farmer has 
priority in the purchase when the land is put up to sale, or can become the new owner even 
though another person has bought the land, and this, up to one month after the purchase by 
this person. This regulation ensures that the farm using the land to sale is not affected by the 
sale, and gives incentives to tenant farmers to become owners and therefore improve the use 
of land (Boinon, 2011). The farmer tenant must however satisfy several criteria: to have been 
a farmer for the past three years at least, to own less than a specific size of land and to 
commit to farm the purchased land during at least nine years. 
While it is clear that SAFER’s intervention may affect the price of sold agricultural land, it is 
less clear how tenants’ pre-emptive rights would influence it. As explained by Latruffe and Le 
Mouël (2006), such rights restrict the number and type of potential buyers. But the effect on 
the price is not clear. As for the EU Nitrate Directive aiming at limiting the quantity, per 
hectare of land, of nitrogen released by livestock, it may increase the demand for agricultural 
land and as a consequence its price. 
3. Conceptual framework and econometric strategy 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
The Present Value Model (PVM) is used here as the basic framework. The PVM model 
stipulates that land price is given by the capitalisation of expected revenues generated by the 
land. More precisely, assuming that the use of the land is on an infinite horizon, the value of 
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land at a period t is given by the sum of discounted revenues from land. In mathematical 
terms (Weersink et al., 1999):  
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where tL  is the value of land at period t; t iR +  is the agricultural revenue generated at period 
t+i; r  is the time-varying discount rate; tE  represents the expectation of the revenue on the 
basis of information available in period t. 
An extension of the basic PVM model consists in accounting for the fact that agricultural land 
price is not solely determined by the revenue generated by agricultural activities, but is also 
affected by the possibility for land to be converted for other uses (e.g. urban development, 
transportation or tourism infrastructures). Hence, an opportunity cost component (i.e. rent 
from alternative uses) is added to the agricultural component of land price (Plantinga and 
Miller, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2003), as follows: 
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where X  is the rent generated from alternative uses of the land; *i  is the period at which the 
conversion to non-agricultural use occurs. 
According to model (3), the current value of agricultural land is a non-linear function of rents 
stemming from agricultural activities, of rents stemming from potential future conversion of 
land to alternative uses, and of the discount rate. 
In this paper we account for regulations that affect the market of agricultural land, and that 
may therefore affect its price. For this, as proposed by Plantinga et al. (2002), a random 
parameter specification is used. The model used is a specific case of the random parameter 
model developed by Hildreth and Houck (1968), Swamy (1970), and Swamy and Tinsley 
(1980). As suggested by Hornbaker et al. (1989) and used by Plantinga et al. (2002) in the 
case of agricultural land price, the parameters to estimate are not fixed but are a function of 
specific explanatory variables, here in particular regulations. Such specification is 
appropriate for the assessment of the role of regulations on land price. Indeed, while some 
regulations affect land prices directly only (e.g. the intervention of SAFER), the 
environmental regulations in particular lay affect land prices directly but also indirectly, 
through the basic factors of the PVM model: the agricultural revenue R and the rent of 
alternative land uses X. 
The random parameter model of land price is: 
ppppppp XRL μααα +++= 210  (4) 
where subscript p denotes the observation level (plot transaction); iμ  is a white noise; and 
the parameters to estimate, p0α , p1α  and p2α , can be written as a function of specific 
explanatory variables Z including regulations, as follows:  
jp
z
pzjpzjjp Z υδδα ++= ∑0  (5) 
where jpυ  is a white noise; 0jδ  and jpzδ  are parameters.  
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The land regulations considered here (see below) are assumed to directly affect the land 
price, while the environmental regulation considered is assumed to affect land both directly 
and indirectly. In addition, other explanatory variables from R and X may also affect land 
price indirectly as well as directly. Therefore, the land price model can be written as follows: 
00 0 0 10 1 1 20 2 2
, ,
p pz pz p pz pz p p pz pz p p
z z z
Zland p p Zenv p p p
L Z Z R Z X
Zland Zenv
δ δ υ δ δ υ δ δ υ
α α μ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + + + + + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
+ + +
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 (6) 
where pZland  are the land regulations variables; pzZ  are explanatory variables excluding 
land regulations but including environmental regulation; 00δ , 10δ , 20δ  and 1pzδ , 2 pzδ  3 pzδ , 
,Zland pα  and ,Zenv pα  are parameters. 
Model (6) can be estimated as an heteroscedastic model using Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares (FGLS), as the model can be rewritten as follows: 
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Model (7) is the model to be estimated. However, the potential rents from agricultural 
activity ( R ) and the potential rents from alternative uses ( X ) for each plot considered are 
not observed. Instead we use proxies which we assume represent the rents as a linear 
function. The potential rents from agricultural activity are thus modelled by (9) and the 
potential rents from alternative uses by (10): 
1 1
H H
t ht ht
h h
R f RV RV
= =
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (9) 
1 1
H H
t ht ht
h h
X g XV XV
= =
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (10) 
where f and g are linear functions; htRV  are proxies for agricultural rent; htXV  are proxies for 
other rent. 
We estimate the model with FGLS on the pooled sample (i.e. all years together), including 
control variables in an additive form: whether the buyer is farmer or not; and some year 
dummies. 
3.2 Accounting for spatial heterogeneity and autocorrelation 
Besides the effect of fundamental explanatory variables which can be derived from the 
theory, land prices may also be influenced by spatial interactions among sold plots. Data on 
land prices may indeed by spatially associated or spatially heterogeneous (Paez and al., 
2001). Two issues may arise that have to be considered when estimating model (7): the 
spatial heterogeneity and the spatial autocorrelation. As explained by Patton and McErlean 
(2003), spatial heterogeneity would indicate that there exist spatially distinct land sub-
markets, while spatial autocorrelation would reveal spatial lag dependence. The authors also 
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stress that not accounting for these spatial issues during the estimations may result in 
parameter estimates that are biased. 
The literature on spatial economics often relies on the use of the SARAR model in 
econometric estimations (Anselin and Florax, 1995; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, 2010). The 
SARAR model is a generalisation of the spatial autoregressive model (SAR) proposed by Cliff 
and Ord (1973, 1981) with spatial autoregressive disturbance terms. The SARAR model, that 
is to say the spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances, can account for 
spatial lags in the dependent variable, in the exogenous variables, and also in the disturbance 
terms (Kelejian and Prucha, 2010). 
We use the SARAR model here, and assume that the spatially weighted average of land prices 
neighbouring plot p (i.e. the spatial lag) affects the price of this plot p (through indirect 
effects), in addition to the effect of standard explanatory variables. We also assume that there 
is one or more omitted variables in our model and that the omitted variables vary spatially. 
Due to the unobserved heterogeneity or dependence, the error term tends to be spatially 
autocorrelated.  
Model (7) can thus be written in a compact form including spatial effects, as in equation (11): 
L WL Bλ β μ= + +  (11) 
with  
Wμ ρ μ ε= +  (12) 
where λ  and ρ  are parameters indicating the extent of spatial effects; W  is a weight matrix 
indicating the spatial structure of the data; ε  is a random term normally distributed such as ( )20,iid Iεε σ  ; and B are the explanatory variables of model (7) and β  their associated 
coefficients. 
In our data set the plot observations are geo-coded according to their location in one of 
Brittany’s municipalities. We assume that all observations within the same municipality are 
uniformly distributed, and their locations are approximated by the municipality centroid. 
Thus, we compute a n n×  (with n the number of observations) spatial weight matrix W in 
which a neighbour set is specified for each observation based on Euclidean distance criterion. 
Considering an inverse-distance function we assume that all units (i,j observations) are 
neighbours2, because the spatial weights decrease with the distance. Self-neighbours are 
excluded, such that the diagonal elements of W are zero. In addition, the weight matrix is 
row-standardized, such that the sum of the elements of each row is unitary. Finally, given the 
size of our sample, the inverse-distance matrix is truncated and stored in a banded form. 
Spatial autocorrelation and heterogeneity have to be treated together (Anselin, 1988). 
Therefore, we estimate the model with the generalized spatial two-stage least squares 
estimator (GS2SLS) (Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999). The estimation procedure is 
performed in three stages. In the first stage equation (11) is estimated with two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) and an instrumental variable matrix H defined as follows:  
( )2, ,H B WB W B=  (13) 
In the second stage the first-stage residuals are used to estimate, with the generalised method 
of moments (GMM), the autoregressive parameter ρ  of equation (12) (Kelejian and Prucha, 
2010). The last stage consists in using ρ  to apply a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to 
equation (11) before estimating it with 2SLS (Kelejian and Prucha, 2010).  
                                                        
2 An alternative way is to consider that the elements Wi,j of W are non-zero when observations i and j 
are neighbours within a specific distance, and zero otherwise. 
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4. Data and variables used 
4.1 Data 
Our data are extracted from the database of all individual transactions of arable and pasture 
land that occurred in Brittany between 1994 and 2010, collected by notaries (the database 
“PERVAL”). We excluded built land, and we excluded very small plots, namely less than 0.15 
hectares. Such plots are very expensive and reflect the possibilities to convert to development 
use. We also removed outliers. In the end, the database that we use consists in 14,991 sale 
transactions over the whole period for the region. The dependent variable, plot price, is the 
price per hectare of the plot exchanged. All variables in values were deflated by the yearly 
French price consumer index with base 2005. 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the average agricultural land prices in Brittany between 
1994 and 2010 in the sample used here. The average price during the period is 4,275 Euros 
per hectare (with a minimum of 1,018 and a maximum of 24,558 Euros), which is in the 
range of average agricultural land prices in France (SAFER-Agreste, 2012). The yearly 
average prices have slightly fluctuated during the period but remained between 4,000 and 
4,800 Euros per hectare. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average area of the sold plots 
over the period considered. The yearly average plot area fluctuates around 4 hectares; the 
average for the whole period is 4.1 hectares (with a minimum of 0.15 and a maximum of 74 
hectares). 
Figure 2. Evolution of the average deflated agricultural land prices (Euros per hectare) in 
Brittany between 1994 and 2010 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on notaries’ data. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of the average plots’ area (hectares) in Brittany between 1994 and 2010 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on notaries’ data. 
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4.2 Variables used in the econometric model 
Table 1 defines the variables used. The dependent variable (L) is the price per hectare for the 
exchanged plot, that is to say the price of the transaction divided by the area of the plot sold. 
The discount rate (r) is the yearly interest rate observed at the country level. The proxies 
related to agricultural rents (R) are: the average agricultural gross margin per hectare of UAA 
for the municipality where the plot is located; the sold plot’s area; the number of agricultural 
family working units per hectare of UAA in the municipality where the plot is located; 
weather variables observed in the municipality where the plot is located (namely quantity of 
rain and atmospheric radiation); and soil characteristic observed in the NUTS4 district where 
the plot is located (namely cation exchange capacity). The proxies related to other rents (X) 
are all measured at the municipality level and include: the population density; the number of 
second homes per hectare of municipality’s area; the growth rate of urbanisation of land; the 
attractiveness measured by the employment concentration rate; and whether the plot’s 
municipality is located in an urban area3. 
As for regulations, they consist in environmental (Zenv) and land transaction regulations 
(Zland). The environmental regulation includes one proxy, namely whether the plot is 
located in a zoning nitrate surplus area. The land regulations include two dummy variables: 
whether the buyer is SAFER; and whether the plot is currently farmed by the buyer. In 
addition, a control variable representing whether the buyer is a farmer is included in the 
regression, as well as some year dummies. 
It should be noted that variables are not observed at the same geographical level (plot or 
municipality or NUTS4 district level) and are observed for different periods: for example, 
transaction’s characteristics are available for each year during 1994-2010, variables extracted 
from the Agricultural Census are for municipalities and for the years 2000 and 2010, 
variables extracted from the Population Census are for municipalities and for the years 1990, 
1999 and 2009, weather variables are for municipalities and for each year between 2000 and 
2008, and the soil variable is the average at the NUTS4 district level for the sub-periods 
1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. Regarding nitrate surplus area zoning, the 
regulation has been implemented in 1994 and revised in 2005 and 2010. Throughout the 
revisions, some NUTS4 districts have changed status (within or without the zoning). 
For some variables there is no information for some observations. The final sample used 
reduces to 13,743 observations. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the estimation. 
Following model (6), we assume that the environmental regulation (Zenv) affects the 
agricultural land price directly as it may be less easy to convert land to non-agricultural uses 
in this area. We also assume that it affects land price indirectly through the random 
parameters, as it may in fact affect the revenue generated by agricultural or non-agricultural 
uses of land. It is also expected that some specific variables affect land prices through the 
revenues R and X. More precisely, it is assumed that the following variables influence the R 
revenue proxy of gross margin per hectare: the interest rate, the plot’s area, the number of 
family working units per hectare of UAA, the location in an urban area or not, all weather and 
soil variables, and the environmental regulation. And it is assumed that the following 
variables influence the X revenue proxy of population density: the atmospheric radiation, the 
number of second homes per hectare, the rate of urbanisation, the employment 
concentration rate, the location in an urban area, and the environmental regulation. 
                                                        
3 The employment concentration rate is the ratio between the number of jobs available in a 
municipality divided by the number of persons living in this municipality and holding a job inside or 
outside the municipality. Is considered as an urban area an area where housing constructions are close 
to each other (less than 200 meters away), with more than 2,000 inhabitants, where at least 10,000 
jobs are available, and which is not located in the suburbs of another urban area (INSEE, 2009). 
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Expectations regarding the total (indirect and direct) influence of explanatory variables on 
land price are as follows. We expect a positive effect, on land price, from revenue proxies that 
are positively correlated with revenues and a negative effect from revenue proxies that are 
negatively correlated with revenues (whether revenues from agriculture R or revenues from 
alternative uses X). Regarding environmental regulations (Zenv), the zoning, that is to say 
the nitrogen constraint imposed by the Nitrate Directive, is expected to have a positive effect 
on land price. As mentioned above, the nitrogen limit imposed by the regulation implies that 
farmers need to spread manure on an increasing land surface. The resulting increasing 
demand for agricultural land would result in an increase in price. As for land regulations 
(Zland), we expect the dummy variable whether the buyer is SAFER to have a negative effect 
on land price due to its possibility to pre-empt plots for which the price is too high and to sell 
them back at a lower price. As explained above, we have no expectation on the sign of the 
effect of the dummy variable whether the buyer is the current farmer tenant. As for the 
control variable of whether the buyer is a farmer, we expect a negative price. The reason 
behind is that a non-farmer buyer may be willing to pay a higher price than a farmer, as the 
planned use of land may not be agricultural and therefore the future land revenue is expected 
to be higher. 
4.3 Econometric models 
The model is estimated firstly ignoring, and secondly accounting for, spatial interactions.  
The model is estimated for the full sample of all buyers, but also for three sub-samples 
depending on the characteristic of the buyer. The first sub-sample includes farmer buyers 
only. The second and third sub-samples include non-farmer buyers only. The difference 
between these two non-farmer sub-samples is that the second sub-sample includes individual 
non-farmer buyers, while the third sub-sample includes the other non-farmer buyers, and in 
particular SAFER and public buyers such as town councils. The objective of estimating the 
model for different sub-samples is to assess whether different buyers have different 
behaviour or plans for the plot purchased. 
Therefore, in total eight models are estimated. 
Table 1. Description of the variables used in the regression 
Variables Year of 
observation 
Observation 
level 
Source 
Dependent variable L    
Land price per hectare of plot 
area 
1994-2010 Plot Notaries 
Interest rate r    
Interest rate 1994-2010 Country Statistical Office INSEE 
R variables    
Agricultural gross margin per 
hectare of UAA 
2000, 2010 Municipality Agricultural Census 
Sold plot’s area 1994-2010 Plot Notaries 
Number of family working units 
per hectare of UAA 
2000, 2010 Municipality Agricultural Census 
Quantity of rain 
2000-2008 Municipality Météo France 
Atmospheric radiation 
Soil cation exchange capacity 
Averages for 
subperiods 1995-
1999, 2000-2004, 
2005-2009 
NUTS4 
district 
Réseau de Mesures de la 
Qualité des Sols (RMQS), 
GIS Sol 
X variables    
Population density 1990, 1999 and 
2009 
Municipality Statistical Office INSEE 
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Number of second homes per 
hectare of municipality’s area 
1990, 1999 and 
2009 
Municipality Statistical Office INSEE 
Growth rate of urbanisation 1990-2000 and 
2000-2006 
Municipality Corine Land Cover 
Attractiveness measured by the 
employment concentration rate 
1990, 1999 and 
2009 
Municipality Statistical Office INSEE 
Urban area location or not a 2000, 2010 Municipality Statistical Office INSEE 
Zenv variable    
In nitrate surplus area or not a 2005, 2010 NUTS4 
district 
Regional office of the 
Ministry of Environment 
Zland variables    
The buyer is SAFER or not a 1994-2010 Plot Notaries 
The plot is currently farmed by 
the buyer or not a 
1994-2010 Plot Notaries 
Control variable    
The buyer is a farmer or not a 1994-2010 Plot Notaries 
a Dummy variables (1 if yes; 0 if no) 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression: full sample of 13,743 
observations 
Variables Unit Average for the 
period 
Dependent variable L   
Land price per hectare Euros per ha 4,303 
Interest rate r   
Interest rate % 4.6 
R variables   
Agricultural gross margin per hectare of UAA Euros per ha 5,336 
Sold plot’s area ha 4.1 
Number of family working units per hectare of UAA Number per ha  0.04 
Quantity of rain mm 855 
Atmospheric radiation J-5/square cm 9.24 
Soil cation exchange capacity cmol+/kg 9.6 
X variables   
Population density Inhabitants per 
square km 
83.7 
Growth rate of urbanisation % 1.6 
Number of second homes per hectare of municipality’s area Number per ha 0.05 
Attractiveness measured by the employment concentration 
rate 
% 66.4 
Urban area location or not a  0.37 
Zenv variable   
In nitrate surplus area or not a  0.63 
Zland variables   
The buyer is SAFER or not a  0.03 
The plot is currently farmed by the buyer or not a  0.41 
Control variable   
The buyer is a farmer or not a  0.62 
a Dummy variables (1 if yes; 0 if no) 
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5. Results 
Table 3 presents the explanatory variables’ marginal effects obtained from the econometric 
estimation ignoring spatial interactions. The second column of the table relate to the 
estimation for the whole sample. Most of the explanatory variables have an expected sign. 
Regarding the agricultural revenue proxies, as expected, the gross margin per hectare and the 
number of family working units per hectare positively influence the land price. The quantity 
of rain and atmospheric radiation decrease the price. However, the plot size has a negative 
effect while a positive effect was expected. All variables proxying the revenue from non-
agricultural uses have the expected sign, namely a positive sign (i.e. the land price increases 
with an increased urbanisation pressure). 
The environmental regulation variable has a positive effect on the land price, suggesting, as 
expected that land prices increase with such regulations due to land competition. Regarding 
the land transaction variables, it is interesting to note that the SAFER intervention does not 
have a significant effect on the sale price. The variable indicating whether the land is 
currently tenanted by the farmer buyer has a negative effect. This may suggest that those 
buyers, knowing that they have priority in purchasing the land, may succeed in reducing the 
land price in the absence of other buyers’ competition. As for the control variable which is 
whether the buyer is a farmer, it has a negative price, confirming that farmers pay less for the 
land that they purchase than non-farmer buyers. 
The estimation was then performed on three sub-samples as explained above. The third 
column of Table 3 reports the marginal effects for the estimation on the sub-sample of farmer 
buyers, while the fourth and fifth columns report the marginal effects for the estimation on 
the sub-samples of, respectively, individual non-farmer buyers and non-individual non-
farmer buyers. The gross margin plays a significant positive role for farmer buyers and for 
individual non-farmer buyers, but the effect is stronger for farmer buyers. As for the quantity 
of rain, it positively influences the price of land purchased by farmers, suggesting a climatic 
effect on harvests, but negatively influences the price of land purchased by individual non-
farmers, suggesting a disinterest for areas with too much rain. The variables influencing the 
revenue from non-agricultural uses play similarly on the price of land purchased by farmer 
buyers and by non-farmer buyers, except for the attractiveness measured by the employment 
concentration rate. As expected this variable has a positive influence on the price of land 
purchased by non-farmer buyers, showing the effect of population pressure. However it has a 
negative influence on the price of land purchased by farmers. Except for the number of 
second homes which has a non significant effect on the price paid by non-farmer non-
individual buyers, for this sub-sample the effects of the X variables are the strongest among 
all sub-samples. 
Regarding the environmental regulation variable, it positively influences the price paid by all 
types of buyers. However, the effect is stronger for the sub-sample of farmer buyers 
suggesting strong competition for agricultural land among farmers. The non-significant effect 
of the SAFER found in the estimation for the whole sample is not confirmed. In fact, the 
variable has a significant negative effect on the price paid by non-farmer non-individual 
buyers, as expected. 
Table 4 similarly presents the results from estimations accounting for spatial interactions 
(model SARAR). All signs of significant coefficients are confirmed. Only two coefficients 
become non significant: the coefficient of the quantity of rain and the coefficient of the 
atmospheric radiation for the estimation on the sub-sample of farmer buyers. 
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Table 3. Results of the regression ignoring spatial interactions: marginal effects * 
 
Whole sample (sub-
samples 1+2+3) 
13,743 observations 
Farmer buyers (sub-
sample 1) 
8,485 observations 
Non farmer 
individual buyers 
(sub-sample 2) 
3,564 observations 
Non farmer other 
buyers (sub-sample 3) 
1,457 observations 
Interest rate r     
Interest rate -0.1259 -0.1352 n.s. n.s. 
R variables     
Agricultural gross margin per hectare of UAA 7.51 E-05 1.45 E-04 7.9175 E-05 n.s. 
Sold plot’s area -2.11 E-02 -8.39 E-03 -0.0280 -0.0303 
Number of family working units per hectare of UAA 11.1567 16.5946 n.i. n.i. 
Quantity of rain -2.75 E-04 0.0004 -0.0020 n.s. 
Atmospheric radiation -0.0197 -0.0207 n.s. 0.1909 
Soil cation exchange capacity -0.1444 -0.0869 -0.1490 -0.2957 
X variables     
Population density 0.0068 0.0057 0.0025 0.0103 
Number of second homes per hectare of municipality’s 
area 1.4334 n.s. 4.2324 n.s. 
Growth rate of urbanisation n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Attractiveness measured by the employment 
concentration rate 0.0009 -0.0011 0.0021 0.0025 
Urban area location or not 0.3668 0.3913 0.2581 0.4405 
Zenv variable     
In nitrate surplus area or not 0.5800 0.6090 0.4587 0.3372 
Zland variables     
The buyer is SAFER or not n.s. n.i. n.i. -0.5283 
The plot is currently farmed by the buyer or not -0.6676 -0.5604 n.i. n.i. 
Control variable     
The buyer is a farmer or not -0.2868 n.i. n.i. n.i. 
R-squares     
R-squares 0.23 0.34 0.10 0.17 
* except for R-squares. 
n.s.: marginal effect not available (parameters in the regression not significant). 
n.i.: variable not included in the regression. 
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Table 4. Results of the regression accounting for spatial interactions (model SARAR): marginal effects * 
 Whole sample (sub-
samples 1+2+3) 
13,743 obs. 
Farmer buyers 
(sub-sample 1) 
8,485 obs. 
Non farmer individual 
buyers (sub-sample 2) 
3,564 obs. 
Non farmer other 
buyers (sub-sample 3) 
1,457 obs. 
Interest rate r     
Interest rate -0.1524 -0.1493 n.s. n.s. 
R variables     
Agricultural gross margin per hectare of UAA 9.2445 E-05 5.8051 E-05 7.1433 E-05 n.s. 
Sold plot’s area -0.0187 -0.0138 -0.0582 -0.0327 
Number of family working units per hectare of UAA 11.6267 16.8338 n.i. n.i. 
Quantity of rain -0.0007 n.s. -0.0024 n.s. 
Atmospheric radiation -0.0276 n.s. n.s. 0.0989 
Soil cation exchange capacity -0.0956 -0.1015 -0.1545 -0.3328 
X variables     
Population density 0.0067 0.0023 0.0015 0.0101 
Number of second homes per hectare of municipality’s 
area 1.4338 n.s. 4.3915 n.s. 
Growth rate of urbanisation n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.0178 
Attractiveness measured by the employment 
concentration rate 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0022 0.0029 
Urban area location or not 0.2499 0.3299 0.2579 0.4488 
Zenv variables     
In nitrate surplus area or not 0.6000 0.6100 0.2476 0.4092 
Zland variables     
The buyer is SAFER or not n.s. n.i. n.i. -0.5957 
The plot is currently farmed by the buyer or not -0.8395 -0.6645 n.i. n.i. 
Control variable     
The buyer is a farmer or not -0.3767 n.i. n.i. n.i. 
Spatial parameters     
Lambda (λ ) 0.2376 0.1997 0.2048 0.1531 
Rho ( ρ ) -0.1732 -0.0401 -0.1022 -0.1134 
* except for lambda and rho. 
n.s.: marginal effect not available (parameters in the regression not significant). 
n.i.: variable not included in the regression. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, using data from individual transactions for the period 1994-2010 in the French 
NUTS2 region Brittany, we investigated how environmental regulations and transaction land 
regulations influence the price of sold plots. Regressions on three sub-samples of buyers were 
performed in order to assess whether different buyers have different attitude or plans 
regarding the farmland purchased: a sub-sample including only farmer buyers, a sub-sample 
including non-farmer individual buyers, and a sub-sample including non-farmer non-
individual buyers. Estimations were performed ignoring and accounting for spatial 
interactions (model SARAR). 
Results indicate that the price of land decreases when buyers are farmers. This may come 
from the fact that, in such cases, the land will be used for agricultural uses and not for 
alternative uses for which the price may be higher. The environmental zoning regulation 
considered (namely the nitrate surplus area zoning) increases the price of land. The effect of 
this zoning regulation is stronger for farmer buyers than other buyers, due to the increased 
competition for land in order to spread manure. Regarding land transaction regulations, 
while we had no a priori expectation on the effect, on land price, of the purchaser being the 
current tenant, we found a significant negative impact. This may reveal the absence of strong 
competition on the land market for plots currently farmed by a tenant, which has a priority 
over other buyers. Contrary to the expectation, we found no significant effect of the SAFER 
pre-emption right in the model estimated for the whole sample. However, when estimating 
the model on less heterogeneous sub-sample of non-farmer non-individual buyers, we found 
a significant negative effect of the SAFER being the buyer. 
While this latter effect was expected, it should also be kept in mind that among the 
transactions pre-empted by SAFER, not all of them are effectively subjected to a reduced 
price. SAFER may intervene on the land market by buying land and selling it back at a lower 
price, but it can also sell it back at the same price but to another buyer. While the first type of 
intervention is to limit price increases, the second is to limit enlargement of farms that are 
already large and to favour the settlement of young farmers. In addition, SAFER’s role is not 
confined to pre-empting land that is being exchanged. Before resorting to this extreme case, 
SAFER firstly tries to solve the issue by mutual agreement. Therefore, a part of SAFER’s 
intervention on the land market is France is not captured in our data (this explains why only 
3% of the transactions considered here were subjected to SAFER’s pre-emption right). 
Estimating the model on different sub-samples depending on the buyers’ type enabled to give 
evidence of effect which would be blurred within the full sample, for example the effect of the 
SAFER being the buyer. Separating into the sub-samples also shed light on the factors that 
are more important for each type of buyer. The results reveal that the price paid by farmer 
buyers is strongly influenced by the gross margin (which proxies the potential agricultural 
revenue that can be generated by the land purchased), and by the location in environmental 
zoning. By contrast, the price paid by non-farmer buyers is more influenced by variables 
proxying the potential revenue that can be generated by non-agricultural use of the land. This 
effect is even more pronounced for the sub-sample of non-farmer non-individual buyers, 
which include SAFER and other public bodies such as administrative councils. This suggests 
that those buyers are more interested in plots which are located near densely populated and 
urbanised areas. This is where conflicts may occur and necessitate SAFER’s intervention to 
avoid land speculation, and this is where agricultural land is more often urbanised. 
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